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Joan Baptista Van Helmont and the Question of Experimental Modernism​[1]​

Abstract. In this paper, I take up the question to what extent and in which sense we can conceive of Johannes Baptista Van Helmont’s (1579-1644) style of experimenting as “modern”. Connected to this question, I shall reflect upon what Van Helmont’s precise contribution to experimental practice was. I will argue - after analysing some of Van Helmont's experiments such as his tree-experiment, ice-experiment, and thermoscope experiment - that Van Helmont had a strong preference to locate experimental designs in places wherein variables can be more easily controlled (and in the limit, in relatively closed physical systems such as paradigmatically the vessel, globe or sphere (vas, globus, sphera)). After having reviewed some alternative candidates, I shall argue that Van Helmont’s usage of relatively isolated physical systems and a moderate degree of quantification, whereby mathematical procedures mainly refer to guaranteeing that quantities are conserved by roughly determining them, are the characteristics that best captures his contributions to “modern” experimentation.
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1. Introduction: Van Helmont’s Reception

The following facts about Joan Baptista Van Helmont (1579-1644)​[2]​ are accepted unanimously by scholars: he was born in Brussels and also died there; he studied at the University of Louvain and at first refused to accept his degree there (however, in 1599 he obtained is doctorate there); he travelled extensively across Europe (he visited France, England, Switzerland and Italy); he was strongly influenced by Paracelsian ideas which led him to conceive of the universe as “an organism in which matter was configured by a series of forces”​[3]​ – however, he rejected Paracelsus’s tria prima (mercury, salt, and sulphur); he believed that water​[4]​ is the universal element​[5]​ that constitutes all things natural; between 1609-1616 he retired to Vilvorde to dedicate himself to an intense study of pyrotechnia; and finally, he coined the term gas​[6]​ (the spiritus sylvestris that was produced when burning charcoal), which he most likely derived from the Greek chaos. What Van Helmont’s precise role in the so called “Scientific Revolution” was and in which way he might have contributed to scientific methodology (and especially, experimental designs) is far less from clear.​[7]​
Past and contemporary appreciation of Van Helmont has always been ambivalent: on the one hand, Van Helmont is praised for various discoveries and for his insistence on empirical observation and experimentation in general​[8]​; on the other hand, Van Helmont is often portrayed as an irrational mystic and alchemist, who criticised human reason (mens rationalis), mathematics and syllogistic reasoning.​[9]​ He claimed that we should not have a rational mind but an intellectual one.​[10]​ According to Van Helmont, only the soul could provide a deeper understanding of nature.​[11]​ Animal reason (mens sensitiva) only knows the external appearance of things: the signatum, but not the meaning hidden in it (de zegelaer).​[12]​ Insight works by means of forms, figures and examples (gedaenten, figueren, en voorbeelden) instead of deductive reasoning. ​[13]​ Dreams were equally important to Van Helmont. In the introduction to the Ortus Medicinae (1648), Van Helmont testified of a revealing dream he had: he found himself in an empty bubble of which the diameter reached from the centre of the earth to the heavens above. From this dream, Van Helmont understood that in Jesus Christ, we live, move, and have our being.​[14]​ Van Helmont also criticised the restrictedness of mathematics: mathematics only studies the quantitative aspects of things, not their inner qualities. Proper science deals not only with how much things are, but how they are.​[15]​ Mathematics places entities under the praedicamentum quantitatis: it does not succeed in penetrating the essence of things (wesentheyt).​[16]​ Likewise, the Aristotelians – by neglecting the inner principles, the semina, of things​[17]​ – reduced things to the status of an artefact.​[18]​ Nature is not concerned with external signs, only with causes.​[19]​
Recently, William R. Newman and Lawrence M. Principe have done an excellent job in gaining more insight in Van Helmont’s experimental practices – some of which we will discuss in the following section. Van Helmont indeed frequently referred to “experiments” (experimenta (mechanica)) to justify his claims. Prima facie, this suggests that one could rightfully claim that there is a modern component to Van Helmont’s thinking. Not very surprisingly, Van Helmont’s experimental procedures have been labelled as “quantitative” and “controlled”.​[20]​ In similar spirit, Robert Halleux once stated that in Van Helmont’s mature work we see “the first trends of a method of enquiry, based upon organized and justified experiments”.​[21]​ Under “modern experimental procedures” I understand, such procedures as: quantification, control, theory-guided practice, practice informed theory, replication, and reproducibility.​[22]​ One aspect might be added to that list. Van Helmont defended the idea of conservation of weight (pondus): all substances are made of an indestructible amount of water that has been rarefied or condensed by the semina.​[23]​ He emphasised the superiority of quantitative measurements derived from weighing things over the scholastic determination of essences by means of logic.​[24]​ Correspondingly, chemical reactions do not affect the weight of the substances involved. Van Helmont saw this as a general maxim of nature: everything desires to remain itself as far as possible.​[25]​
The theme of this essay is connected to this matter. What was Van Helmont’s precise contribution to scientific methodology? To what extent can his scientific practice be considered as “modern”? Why is it that historians of science have granted (and continue to grant) Van Helmont’s style of experimenting the label “modern”? As I see it, the reasons for this need to be rendered more explicit. Let me first of all point out that we should always be aware that Van Helmont’s concept of experience (d’ ervarentheyt​[26]​) and experiment were not yet as sharply delineated as ours.​[27]​ Contrary to an experience, an experiment presupposes the involvement of a specific question about nature which the experimental outcome is designed to answer.​[28]​ Experiments always describe specific events and attempt to provide answers to specific questions. In Van Helmont’s usage of these terms there was no sharp distinction between both. According to Halleux, three expressions frequently occur in Van Helmont’s experimental procedures:​[29]​

(1)	experimentum: technical or medical procedures which are not fully rationally justified and there is no other evidence that they exist unless the success they produce;
(2)	mechanica probatio (“hand-on demonstration”): proofs taken from the laboratory; and,
(3)	quaerere per ignem (“questioning by fire”): Paracelsian methods of chemical fire analysis.​[30]​

In their recent study, Newman & Principe have particularly focussed on (3).​[31]​ Van Helmont used different expressions to refer to this practice: “by the art of fire”​[32]​, “artificial fire”​[33]​, “by an artificial diligent search”​[34]​, and “artificial skill”​[35]​. I will consider Halleux’s trichotomy as a valuable working-hypothesis, but my essay does not need to presuppose its validity. I will take up this issue near the end of this essay. In this paper, it is my aim to supplement Halleux and Newman & Principe from a methodological perspective. By carefully analysing some of Van Helmont’s paradigmatic experiments (see section 2), I will be able to point to the underlying epistemological unity they exhibited: Van Helmont’s style of experimenting displayed a strong preference to situate experimental designs in loci wherein variables can be more easily controlled (and in the limit, in relatively closed physical systems).
One caveat should be made from the outset: I do not endorse an essentialist idea of science, i.e. I do not commit myself to the view that there is an “essence” of science – if there could be such a thing – that remains fixed throughout its history. Scientific knowledge and its relevant inferential procedures change over time; both vary at different places and at different moments in times. Correspondingly, it is not my aim to demonstrate that Van Helmont anticipated our modern conception of science in general or experiment specifically. There is no teleology in the development of science. Rather, my aim is to compare some features of experimentation which have become crucial to our contemporary understanding of experiments with some features of what might prima facie be considered as “experimental knowledge” which were important to Van Helmont.​[36]​ In doing so, it will be possible to carefully ascertain Van Helmont’s contribution to experimental methodology.​[37]​

2. Van Helmont’s Paradigmatic Experiments

In this section, I will discuss four significant experiments from Van Helmont’s work in full detail: (1) the thermoscope experiment, (2) the transmutation experiment, the ice-experiment, and (4) the willow experiment. I will draw the main material from both Ortus Medicinae (1648) and Dageraad (1944). These experiments have been selected on the basis of their being methodologically relevant and sufficiently detailed. For the English translation of Ortus Medicinae, I have relied on the English version of 1664 Oratrike or Physick Refined (which is, by the way, not an excellent translation) and compared it to the Latin edition – I refer to the latter in footnotes.​[38]​ I will focus on and discuss what Van Helmont calls mechanical experiments. It should be stressed, as Newman and Principe have noticed before me, that the term “mechanical” is somewhat misleading here.​[39]​ The Low-German equivalent “handtdadelijcke mechanijcke bewesen”, i.e. “hand-on” or “handicraft”, better illustrates Van Helmont’s notion of a mechanical experiment: generally, it referred to natural processes which were deliberately manipulated at the hand of the investigator of nature and is not directly connected to simple machines. I will use my analysis of these experiments as a basis for a general discussion of the characteristics of experimentation in Van Helmont’s work in the following section. 

(1) Let us first of all look at Van Helmont’s thermoscope experiment.​[40]​ According to Van Helmont, the demonstration was essentially based on mathematics (he calls it a “demonstratio mathematica”​[41]​). It sets out to falsify the thesis according to which water and air can be transformed into one another: Van Helmont rejected both that air can be transformed into water by heating and that water can be transformed into air by heating. (Van Helmont accepted that water can be produced by the condensation of air (and hence, by cold).) Now for the experiment itself. Two spheres A and D are connected to each other by BCE. Both spheres are filled with air. The pipe BC is filled with vitriol which was coloured red by the steeping of roses. It is essential that the two spheres are perfectly closed “perfectissime clausa”.​[42]​ Van Helmont established by observation that without the opening in F, the liquor in BC cannot be moved from its place by heating the air in A (see Figure 1). Van Helmont points to the great practical difficulty of the experiment:






Figure 1. Van Helmont’s thermoscope experiment.

When heating the air in A no extra water was produced. Van Helmont explained this by assuming that the air in the upper part of the vessel thickened as it tried to expand (“Aër (…) accrescit per augmentum dimensionum, & ideo occupat plus loci, quam antea”​[44]​). The amount of fluid remains the same, contrary to the opinion of Van Helmont’s opponent, Henricus van Heers, a medic of Liège, according to whom the compressing of air by heath produces water (“quod aer compressus, conversatur in aquam”​[45]​). Van Helmont stressed that van Heers faulty interpretation was due to his ignorance of mathematics:

But Heer boasted amongst Idiots, that he had sometimes been a Professour (sic) of the Mathematicks at Padua. Wherefore I would demonstrate in paper, his every way ignorance of Mathematics.​[46]​

Next, Van Helmont proceeded to show that the water cannot dry up (“exsiccare”) or be exhaled (“exhalare”) by heating, if A and D are kept carefully shut.​[47]​ Since no extra water was produced when heating the air contained in A, the thesis that air can be transformed into water is untenable, according to Van Helmont. Similarly, since no water disappeared when heating the vessel, the thesis that water can be transformed into air (“quod liquor sit mutatus in aëris”) is untenable. The above experiment further exhibits the following features:

(a)	The potential movement of the water is visualised by colouration – note that there are only four figures in Ortus (they are absent in Dageraad).
(b)	By using a sphere (sphera or globus) all disturbing factors (e.g., extra air or fluid) are screened off. The amount of air and water is kept fixed.
(c)	By using the sphere we establish a relatively isolated physical system (see section 3).

(2) Van Helmont claimed to have rebutted Aristotle’s doctrine of the four elements and to have proven by “handtdadelijcke mechanijcke bewesen” and “mathese” that all matter originates from water.​[48]​ I refer to this experiment as the transmutation experiment. These proofs consisted in showing that all material can be reduced “by art” to a salt which has an identical weight to that of the original material. When this salt is mixed with a corrosive it turns into “vivid water”.​[49]​ Once the corrosive is again separated from the “vivid water”, an identical amount of corrosive is separated from an amount of clear water. Hence, Van Helmont is able to conclude that the original material should consist of water in the first place (reference to the constancy of matter is crucial in his argumentation). As I would interpret it, Van Helmont’s reference to mathese, precisely lies in his reference to the conservation of matter. Van Helmont’s reasoning process​[50]​ goes as follows:

(1)	all material =>(by fire)  salt (where the initial matter weighs as much as the obtained salt)
(2)	[salt + corrosive] =>(mixing) vivid water
(3)	vivid water =>(filtering) [corrosive + clear water] (where the corrosive weighs as much as the corrosive used in (2))
(4)	all material =>(by fire, mixing and filtering) water (by steps (1)-(3) and the conditions in (1) and (3))

Bear in mind that by steps (2) and (3) Van Helmont is able to show that: [salt + corrosive] =>(mixing and filtering) [corrosive + clear water]. Since the corrosive is identical, we have: salt =>(mixing and filtering) clear water. Note that, next to these “mechanical” proofs, Van Helmont also stressed a biblical reason not to accept Aristotle’s doctrine: in Genesis there is no mentioning of the creation of the four elements.​[51]​

(3) The next experiment I shall discuss is the ice-experiment. The aim of the experiment is (again) to show that air cannot be turned into water. It proceeds as follows:

Fill a glassen and great Bottle, with pieces of Ice, but let the neck be shut with a Hermes Seal, by the melting of the glasse in the same place. Then let this Bottle be put in a balance, the weight thereof being laid in the contrary Scale; and thou shalt see that the water, after the Ice is melted, shall be weightier by almost an eight part than it self being Ice. Which thing, since it may be a thousand times done by the same water reserving always the same weight, it cannot be said, that any part thereof has been turned into air.​[52]​

One thing we should keep in mind, as T.S. Patterson has argued, Van Helmont refers to an increase of the specific weight of the water, i.e. the weight per fixed unit of volume, obviously not of its absolute weight.​[53]​ Newman & Principe further stress that Van Helmont had no distinct terminology for absolute and specific weight.​[54]​ We notice that Van Helmont used the sphere as a means to isolate the volume of water and air. No water or air can escape, nor enter the vessel. Since the absolute weight of the water remains identical, the variations in its specific weight cannot be attributed to the fact that some amount of air is changed into water (this would result in a change in the absolute weight of the water). The changes in specific weight can thus only be explained by the expansion of the water when freezing. This converges with what Van Helmont wrote in his letter to Père Marin Mersenne on 30th of January, 1631: “glaciari ipsum est actus effectivus et primarius aquae”.​[55]​ According to Van Helmont, this is a “mechanical” demonstration: probatur per mechanicam.​[56]​

(4) Hereafter, follows a description of Van Helmont’s famous tree-experiment​[57]​, which Van Helmont also considered to be a mechanical demonstration (“ostendi in mechanica”​[58]​):

But I have learned by this handicraft-operation, that all Vegetables do immediately, and materially proceed out of the Element of Water only. For I took an Earthen Vessel [vas], in which I put 200 pounds of Earth that had been dried in a Furnace, weighing five pounds; and at length, five years being finished, the Tree sprung from thence, did weigh 169 pounds, and about three ounces: But I moystened the Earthen Vessel with Rain-water, or distilled water (always when there was need) and it was large, and implanted into the Earth and least the dust that flew about should be co-mingled with the Earth, I covered the lip of the mouth of the Vessel, with an Iron-plate with Tin, and easily passable with many wholes. At length, I again dried the Earth of the Vessel, and there were found the same 200 pounds, wanting about two ounces. Therefore 164 pounds of Wood, Barks, and Roots, arose out of water onely.​[59]​

Newman & Principe note that this experiment “gives a clear example of his quantitative technique”.​[60]​ The explanandum here is the weight and growth of the tree. First of all, the weight of the earth is measured. That the earth has been dried on a fire and is isolated from the external world by means of a plate is significant here, since these conditions guarantee that no other elements than earth could reside in the pot. That the water is distilled (or is rainwater) equally guarantees that no other elements than water reside in the pot. This assumption was later challenged by James Woodward in 1700. In contemporary parlance, we would say that these variables (earth and water) are controlled.​[61]​ Then, the gained weight of the tree is measured (ca. 164 pounds). Note however that after five years Van Helmont weighed the “Wood, Barks, and Roots”. Apparently, Van Helmont did not include the weight of the leaves for whatever reason. Notice further that Van Helmont is not worried at all by difference of two ounces. Given that there did not reside any other elements than earth and water in the pot, and that the earth did not diminish significantly, Van Helmont (wrongly) concluded that only the water produces the growth of the tree. 

One remark should be added here. Van Helmont sometimes used the term “mechanical experiment” in a very loose sense. A mechanical experiment does not always refer to an experiment made at the hand of the natural philosopher. For instance, from the fact that flowers follow the motion of the Sun (even when the Sun does not shine), Van Helmont concluded that flowers have some kind of instinctum.​[62]​ In this case, no direct intervention or isolation of variables is presupposed. This example shows that Van Helmont’s idea of mechanical experiment is not limited to experiments as “experimenta”, that is purposely performed tests of naturalistic theses, but also contained a broader spectrum of rather loose evidence. As I have stressed in the introduction, Van Helmont did not have the same notion of experiment as we do. Van Helmont’s loose usage of the term “mechanical experiment” shows that Halleux’s reduction of it to “proofs taken from the laboratory” is too narrow: for Van Helmont it referred to more than that. In addition to that, Van Helmont allowed for anecdotes (een geschiedenis)​[63]​ and loose observations. For instance, the constant dripping of saltpetre in caves is an indication (een teken) that stone is transformed again into its primary principle: water.​[64]​

3. Modern Strata in Van Helmont’s Experimental Procedures

Now that we have carefully acquainted ourselves with Van Helmont’s style of experimentation, it is time to address his way of experimenting more generally. In this section, I will discuss what prima facie might appear as appropriate modern concepts to describe Van Helmont’s most original contribution to experimental designs. The candidates are: (1) the idea of an operative science, (2) quantification, (3) replication and reproduction, and finally, (4) the importance attributed to isolating certain factors of a physical system by keeping variables fixed (in the limit, this entails the creation of a (relatively) closed physical system, where almost all external variables are screened off and only the relevant internal properties are manipulated). I will discuss these features separately in the following subsections. I shall try to argue that the second and the fourth option – in the sense that will be specified below – best highlight Van Helmont’s contributions to experimental reasoning.

Scientia Operativa: From Aristotle to Van Helmont

The first candidate to describe Van Helmont’s contribution to experimental methodology was his adherence to the idea of a scientia operativa. One might try to make a similar move as Antonio Pérez-Ramos has done in the case of Francis Bacon and argue that Van Helmont was one of the earliest defenders of the idea of an operative science. Van Helmont indeed considered medicine as a handcraft (handt-werck) to be on a par with carpentry and ironwork.​[65]​ Healing is a “work” that is completed by the art of fire.​[66]​ His scientific practice contains a strong insistence on intervening and manipulating natural processes. Van Helmont explicitly spoke of “handicraft-operations” (“handtdadelijcke mechanijcke bewesen” or “handdadige Mechanica”​[67]​): operations made at the hand of the inquirer.​[68]​ The Latin standard expression for this type of experiment is “per mechanicam”​[69]​. 
   In the literature on the emergence of the idea of science as an operative science (scientia operativa), Francis Bacon is usually given special credit for this transformation.​[70]​ Accordingly, Bacon reacted against the Aristotelian dichotomy​[71]​ between products of nature (naturalia) and human arts (artificialia) by showing that there is no ontological difference between the spontaneous workings of nature and the workings which are directed or manipulated by man’s purposive action.​[72]​ Nature always maintains the same modus operandi. Recently, scholars have tempered the usual focus on Bacon with respect to the emergence of scientia operativa. In her broad study, Pamela H. Smith concludes that the idea of scientia operativa had a broad sociological adherence between the fifteenth and seventeenth century  among artists, natural philosophers, medics, craftsmen, … etc.:

The idea of an “active science,” however, goes back not to Bacon, but to the writings and of work of art of Dürer, Leonardo, Palissy, to the makers of the works of art that filled art and curiosity cabinets, and to the writings and persona of Paracelsus. These artisans and practitioners appealed to nature as the basis of their science.​[73]​





Van Helmont’s critique on mathematics should not be interpreted as a rejection of mathematics in toto, only as a careful awareness of the limits of mathematics.​[84]​ The archeus compelled obedience from nature to mathematics.​[85]​ Already in 1607, Van Helmont considered mathematical demonstrations (geometricae demonstrationes) as essential to appraising nature (“quas sola natura metiri potes”​[86]​). Van Helmont distinguished between scientia memorativa (collecting and preserving observations) and scientia applicationis rerum ad mensuram (applied mathematical knowledge).​[87]​
   Although, modern quantitative-like aspects play a role in Van Helmont’s experimental procedures, and although he often stressed the mathematical component in his arguments​[88]​, it would be clearly wrong to call Van Helmont’s experimental procedures equally quantified as our contemporary ones, in which both the level of accuracy has become more important (since our means of measurement have expanded drastically) and the mathematics involved has become more complex (e.g. the usage of statistics and formulae).​[89]​ The importance of mathematical arguments in Van Helmont’s work is mainly restricted to determination of weights and density-ratios. However, it should be granted that Van Helmont’s ordering of the density-ratio’s of tin (which he used as his standard unit), iron, copper, silver, lead, mercury, and gold differs from the modern ones by only an average of less than 2 percent.​[90]​ It should be kept in mind that these were proportions between the specific weights of these materials, not absolute values. The exact values are mostly presented roughly and full details are in most cases not treated (at least in the published versions). The prominence of the mathematics involved in weighing procedures derived from Van Helmont’s thesis that the quantity of matter remains constant during chemical reactions.​[91]​




What about replication (which refers to the fact that we are able to obtain the same results with the same experimental set-up) and reproducibility (which refers to the fact that we are able to obtain the same results by a different investigator​[98]​)? Replicating and reproducing experimental designs are indeed the pillars of modern science.​[99]​ Procedures of social (or better: epistemological) control, such as having experiments witnessed and attested by qualified observers, i.e. fellow gentleman virtuosi, were crucial to the establishment of modern science.​[100]​ Van Helmont did not seem to stress these conditions much.​[101]​ Van Helmont’s work did not incorporate (as Boyle’s work did) an explicit social technology, i.e. the conventions experimental philosophers should use in dealing with each other and considering knowledge claims.​[102]​ Van Helmont did not engage in public experimentation. In addition to that, a detailed literary technology is also absent in Van Helmont’s work. The contrast between Boyle’s detailed written accounts of experiments and his air-pumps is striking in this respect.​[103]​ He did mention replication and reproducibility rather sporadically and did not insist much on them as a criterion of valuable scientific knowledge.​[104]​ For instance, Van Helmont did not give specific information that allows one to redo certain experiments. An experiment, for Van Helmont, was thus a personal testimony which is not directly supposed to be redone by different agents in order to qualify as scientifically valuable. In the thermoscope experiment, Van Helmont’s only comment on its preparation was that it is “very great” (see the quote in section 2). In the ice-experiment, he stresses that the absolute weight of the water stays the same “since it might be a thousand time done by the same water”. His tree-experiment is apparently based on Van Helmont’s observation of only one tree. As far as we know from Van Helmont’s published account, the experiment was not replicated. These “modern” trends remained fairly underdeveloped in Van Helmont’s work.

The Vessel as a Closed Physical System

In Van Helmont’s work we clearly see an interventionist approach towards scientific inquiry. According to such an approach, causal relations can be discovered by actively manipulating natural processes. Generally: If we wish to establish whether A causes B, we will need to establish whether deliberate and purposive variations in A result in variations in B – while keeping fixed all other factors. If A produces the expected changes in B, the causal relation is established. That other factors are kept fixed is essential here: it allows us to reason that the variations in B can only be explained by referring to the variations in A. A “relatively closed system” (see infra) precisely serves as a locus in which the keeping fixed of factors is facilitated. I will begin by clarifying my terminology; then I will show how it is embodied in Van Helmont’s experimental practice.
Let me first of all clarify what I mean by the term “closed physical system”.​[105]​ A closed physical system is hermetically isolated and independent from its environment: there are no interactions between components of the system and the surrounding environment. Such a system has a constant number of particles, energy, or volume, … etc. Such a system is literally “cut loose” from its environment. A closed system is especially useful to isolate the relevant properties we are interested in. Such a system guarantees us that no other influences are active (and hence, that no external influences need to be adduced for the effects we observe in the system under consideration). In explaining G. H. Von Wright’s intuition of closed systems​[106]​, which allows screening-off causal influences from outside the system, Hans Radder supposes the following definition of physical closedness:

Suppose we have a system S localized in space and time with initial and final states a and b. We now examine the role of state a0, which immediately precedes a and is therefore outside S note that a0 is produced only by active and intentional interference. If system S is to be closed in the above sense, then firstly a0 must not be sufficient of for a, and secondly, not sufficient for all next stages of S up to and including final state b. Thus for closedness a first condition is that the system will not ‘by itself’ move from state a0 to a. Furthermore a0 must not ‘influence’ S through one of the intermediate states or the final state, i.e. a0 must not be sufficient for one or more of these states.​[107]​ 

The idea is that by purposive intervention we produce the required initial state in a closed system where – by definition – no other causal variables are active or interfere with the internal processes (see Figure 2):

                intervention                     closed system
     a0              a              b    
                                              internal causal process

Figure 2. Intervention on a closed physical system.

The causal influence of a0 is strictly restricted to producing a and it has no effect on what happens further in the closed system. Of course, in practice we do not have closed physical systems at our disposal. The best we can do is to try to create “relatively closed physical systems”.​[108]​ Creating relatively closed systems is a way of controlling variables – of course, Van Helmont did not himself use terminology like this. However, his practice is embodied by this procedure. Van Helmont frequently used the sphere as a relatively closed physical system. This interventionist approach which is especially striking in the works of Van Helmont is a particularization of scientia operativa.




Concerning Halleux’s trichotomy, I wish to point out the following. A full confirmation of falsification of Halleux’s classification can only be based on a thorough study of Van Helmont’s 
complete work (ca. 1200 pages). This clearly exceeds the content of this essay. One thing is for sure, besides a careful philological comparison of Van Helmont’s usage of words as “experimentum”, “observatio”, … etc., a careful study of Van Helmont’s implicit methodological considerations is also a desideratum for understanding Van Helmont’s idea of “experiment”. I hope to have demonstrated the importance of such a methodological outlook.
In this paper, I have not argued that Van Helmont anticipated our modern conception of experimentation Rather, I have analysed to what extent the characteristics of Van Helmont’s concept of experimentation correspond to characteristics of our modern conception of experimentation. Of the four components discussed in the previous section, the frequent reference to closed or controlled systems and a moderate level of quantification (in the sense which was specified in 3) seem to have been Van Helmont’s most significant contributions to experimental methodology. Van Helmont was not only a “philosopher in the fire” (“philosophus per ignem”), he was also a “philosopher of the sphere” (“philosophus spherae”) – see figure 3. The sphere or vessel refers to processes of inquiry such as isolating, manipulating, and controlling natural processes. The vessel was perhaps Van Helmont’s primary tool of investigation and it symbolized the epistemological ideal according to which we gain knowledge about nature by isolating natural phenomena and by screening-off factors while keeping fixed others. Although Van Helmont’s procedures of screening-off frequently turned out to be not sufficiently fine-tuned, learning from Van Helmont’s failure undoubtedly paved the way for the development of more complex strategies of controlled experimentation.
In line with the above interpretation, Woodward’s refutation of Van Helmont’s willow experiment included both more exactness and more variables being fixed. Woodward weighed plants and the composition of water in more detail. He put different plants of the same kind near the same window (hence: species, warmth, and, amount of air and light are kept fixed).​[109]​ He further compared water of different origin (rain water, Thames water, etc.) and constructed an artefact which guaranteed that the water can only be exhaled by the plants.​[110]​
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